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This article begins by asking why Karl Deutsch never directly intervened in what has come to be known in the field as the second debate. This point of departure is used to outline Deutsch’s views on the purpose of knowledge. It is apparent that Deutsch was unwilling to make the distinction between the traditional and scientific approaches, which stood at the heart of the debate started by Hedley Bull. Deutsch’s position tried to embrace both approaches, because they were necessary in order to answer the big and important questions he asked. Deutsch also rejected the notion that the scientific approach could be devoid of normative concerns. Finally, the article argues that Deutsch keenly adopted methods connected with the scientific approach because he believed they made it possible to spot new patterns which might hold novel answers to the profoundly normative question of humankind’s survival.
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Hedley Bull was wrong. His judgement about the contribution, or rather the lack thereof, of what he termed as the scientific approach to the study of international politics was reckless.1 But as is often the case, stating one’s own beliefs and prejudices in stark terms spurred a lively and spirited, as well as sometimes mean-spirited, debate among the adherents of the two main camps – traditionalist and scientific – outlined by Bull. The accused felt the need to defend their position and, while doing so, to launch their own counter-attack. The process of exchanges tracing its roots to Bull’s article published in World Politics in 1966 has come to be known in the field of International Relations as the ‘second debate’.2 Contentious though it may be, the designation allows for one way of telling the history of the field and conveying the sense of its development. Hence, we should be grateful to Bull, irrespective of any shortcomings that his contribution might have suffered from. This was, of course, not the only time when he performed such a valuable service to the discipline.3 Indeed, much like any story involving accusers and accused needs, in order to both entertain and elucidate, a Dr Watson to its Sherlock Holmes, a Captain Hastings to its Hercule Poirot, or an uncomprehending male detective to its Miss Marple, so any debate in International Relations requires its Bull – passionate, thought-provoking and misguided. The difference is that in the discipline there never is and cannot be the far-sighted, logically impeccable and unerring mind to establish the clear links. We appear, therefore, to have no short supply of entertainment, but not that much in terms of elucidation. It is easy to spot where Bull commits a blunder in a Watson-like manner, but impossible to set him on the correct path.
The work of Karl Deutsch represented one of the main objects of criticisms expressed by Hedley Bull. In a well-known depiction, Bull repeatedly disparaged Deutsch’s research for its ‘fetish for measurement’. Whereas the original article in World Politics made this connection only indirectly – Deutsch’s work, along with that of his former student Bruce Russett, was offered as an example of such fetish – Bull’s overview of the disciplinary history in The Aberystwyth Papers, published several years later, referred directly to ‘his [i.e. Deutsch’s] fetish for measurement’.4 Subsequently, a somewhat less combative and more forward-looking article about International Relations theory reverted to the indirect indictment, but nevertheless still contained the phrase.5 Bull’s writing noted some contributions made by Deutsch, but this these werewas said to be come despite, not thanks to, the approach which he adopted.6 In short, the critique was severe and persistent. And yet, Deutsch, a writer of breathtaking and monumental productivity, never once over this period took up the pen to defend his scholarship against Bull’s charges.7
Deutsch’s silence and unwillingness to join the debate, which it suggests, provide the initial puzzle for this article. In the absence of any direct material that would make it possible to ascertain Deutsch’s position, any answer must necessarily be of a speculative character. Unless additional sources, be they personal recollections of those who were acquainted with him, unpublished manuscripts, private correspondence or some other materials appear, there is simply no way to tell what Deutsch thought about the second debate and why he never intervened in it. But rather than being a source of frustration, the article treats this situation as an invitation to probe in greater depth the scholarly position adopted by Karl Deutsch.
It should be possible to construct an argument that would enable us to understand Deutsch’s position in relation to the claims raised by Hedley Bull which constituted the second debate as well as to appreciate Deutsch’s position on its own terms. The article is therefore neither an exercise in assessing the relative merits of Bull’s critique of the scientific approach, nor a defence of that approach derived from Deutsch’s writings. Bull was wrong, and here, I owe a clarification of the opening sentence, precisely because he got too fixated on the quantification and the alleged fetish for measurement. In doing so, and in contravention of the virtues he claimed for the traditional approach, he failed to offer a sound judgement based on a good understanding of what he was criticizing in Deutsch’s work. The article aims to offer such an understanding of Deutsch’s position. That is why the article carries the subtitle ‘Karl Deutsch in the Second Debate’, because by thinking about Deutsch’s position in connection with that debate, we should be able to gain a better grasp of it.
With regard to Deutsch’s position between the traditional and scientific approaches to International Relations, the article makes the following three arguments. First, Deutsch did not take part in the second debate, because the notion of two distinctive approaches – traditional and scientific – ran directly contrary to his views about what was needed in the proper study of International Relations. Such a study required elements contained both in the traditional and scientific approaches, hence artificially dividing them made little sense. Second, Deutsch rejected the distinction between the traditional and scientific approaches because it implied that the scientific approach was devoid of normative concerns. The distinction was thus not merely wrong, but it was also fundamentally unhelpful when trying to gain answers to burning questions facing the humanity. Third, Deutsch adopted predominantly the methods connected with the scientific approach because they offered as yet untried possibilities when tackling those enormously important questions. He did not deem them superior to the traditional methods in some absolute terms. Instead, he viewed them as potentially holding answers that could not have been previously spotted and noticed.
To formulate the three core arguments about Deutsch’s scholarly position, the article makes use of a number of his lesser known writings. Chief among these are his articles and book chapters on science and its relationship to other forms of generating knowledge about the world. They articulate what might best be described as a humanistic view of science. Similarly important are several of Deutsch’s writings about the discipline, typically, though not exclusively, conceived broadly as political science rather than just as International Relations. Here, the relationship between various components of political theory takes on particular significance. Finally, the article draws on some materials which are located in the Harvard University Archives, and do not appear to have been previously explored in published form. They concern both the possibilities contained in scientific methods as well as the need for their use towards addressing profoundly normative questions.
The article hopes to make several contributions. First, it aims to provide a better understanding of Karl Deutsch’s scholarly position when it comes to the relationship between the traditional and scientific approaches and how this position reflects his views about the field as well as about the world. Second, the article offers a contribution towards some important aspects of the second debate in particular and the disciplinary history of International Relations in general. Finally, by articulating Deutsch’s position, the article offers an insight about the possibilities of conducting inquiry into International Relations which is sensitive to both traditional and scientific approaches and thus holds significant promise for present and future research.
The second debate
Some years ago, providing a critical overview of the disciplinary history and historiography of International Relations, Brian Schmidt stated the obvious about the second debate. He noted how the problem in trying to gain a better comprehension of it was the fact that in comparison to ‘the recent research on the interwar period of the field’s history, the details generally associated with the “second great debate” or the “traditionalism versus scientism debate” have not been carefully and systematically investigated’.8 Since Schmidt wrote these words more than a decade ago, not much has changed. Largely as a result of the significant revival of interest in classical realism, and especially in the figure of Hans Morgenthau, the field does have an even better understanding of the first debate and of the disciplinary history in the 1940s and the 1950s.9 But the knowledge of the second debate has not increased. Indeed, in a revised version of his chapter, Schmidt was able to repeat his earlier statement.10 There has been no careful or systematic investigation of the second debate.
This article cannot, by definition, provide a systematic investigation of the second debate. But by trying to construct and comprehend the position of Karl Deutsch in this debate, it aims to contribute towards a more careful analysis. In particular, it attempts to move beyond the narrow understanding of the second debate as involving a fundamental choice between the traditional and scientific approaches, reducing it to a methodological disagreement. That is a fairly contentious objective, because most of those involved in the controversy did clearly see it as a dispute ‘over what constitutes valid knowledge’.11 To quote once more from Klaus Knorr and James Rosenau, ‘the controversy is not over the substance of international politics. It is the mode of analysis, not its subject matter, that is the central issue’.12 This view has also been endorsed by subsequent observers, such as John Vasquez, who dismissed the possibilities that the debate was over the focus on behaviour or a contestation about the relative place of empirical and normative concerns. Instead, Vasquez claimed that ‘the debate is over scientific methodology’.13
The problem with the argument that the second debate merely boiled down to a dispute about proper methodology is the following. Why would one of the chief representatives of the scientific approach, indeed its indisputably main agent when it came to quantification and statistical treatment of the carefully collected empirical data, not defend in any way the methodological position that he clearly adopted and with which he was unanimously identified? This is puzzling, since especially in the case of Hedley Bull’s critique, Deutsch was thoroughly condemned for this methodological choice. Were it only the adoption of correct methodology that was at stake, why exactly would Deutsch choose to remain silent? There would be little trouble in stating, or more precisely restating, the grounds for his predominant preference for quantitative methods. We may, given his continued use of these methods, safely dismiss the option that he was convinced by Bull’s argument. Perhaps he might have considered the critique so far beside the point and as so outlandish that it was not worth his reply. That is certainly a possibility and must not be discounted as a plausible answer. This article argues, however, that from Deutsch’s perspective, more than a methodological choice was at stake.
The basic dichotomy between the traditional and scientific approaches outlined by Bull set the parameters of the debate. Its acceptance, as the numerous contributions show, constituted a condition of joining in the dispute. Authors argued against or in favour of one of the approaches that Bull delineated. In this sense, Bull provided the rules of the game, in which, as J. David Singer, following the categorization devised by Anatol Rapoport, reminded the readers, the objective was to outwit the opponent.14 A refusal to adopt the traditional/scientific dichotomy, as I claim was the case with Karl Deutsch, manifested not only the unwillingness to accept the rules of the game, but, crucially, the game itself. The rejection of the game stemmed from a set of Deutsch’s beliefs that tried to accommodate aspects associated with both the traditional and scientific approaches. In so far as scholarship is defined as the quest to formulate important questions and the search for possible answers, one approach could not have been repudiated at the expense of the other.
In order to construct Deutsch’s position and understand its relationship to Bull’s critique, it is necessary to briefly restate the latter’s main arguments. In doing so, it will be possible to begin to see why Deutsch would not be drawn into the second debate. This will then be further developed in the exposition of the three main arguments underpinning Deutsch’s position – namely, his humanistic notion of science, normative concerns and the preference for quantitative methods.
Hedley Bull’s characteristics of the two approaches competing within the discipline of International Relations were 4 straightforward. The classical approach ‘derives from philosophy, history, and law’, relies explicitly upon ‘upon the exercise of judgment’ and assumes that ‘general propositions cannot be accorded anything more than the tentative and inconclusive status appropriate to their doubtful origin’.15 In contrast, the scientific approach was notable for its aspiration to formulate ‘a theory of international relations whose propositions are based either upon logical or mathematical proof, or upon strict, empirical procedures of verification’.16 Bull listed Karl Deutsch as one among the chief proponents of the scientific approach, along with such personalities as Morton Kaplan, John Von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern, Thomas Schelling, Kenneth Boulding or Anatol Rapoport.
While it is always dangerous to draw conclusions from any scholar’s personal background, it is not without interest to note here that Deutsch might have fit well within Bull’s criteria that would qualify him to practise the classical approach without much difficulty. He was, after all, classically educated at a gymnasium in Prague during the interwar period and studied for a degree in law at Prague’s Charles University, which he received in 1938, not long before the outbreak of the Second World War. The curriculum at Charles University demanded that he took standard courses in legal history, philosophy and law.17 Several of his initial publications in the United States were explicitly historical in their emphasis.18 His first appointment at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) was as Assistant Professor of History and while there he made a pitch to publishers for an edited book Basic Images of Western Civilization that would serve a course in the history of ideas and ‘make the basic ideas clear enough so that they could be understood by persons who were no specialists in philosophy or the social sciences, and attractive enough to hold the attention of busy engineers’.19 In short, Deutsch was certainly no stranger to philosophy, history and law, nor was he negatively predisposed to any of these areas. He did make arguments about significant phenomena in international politics and stressed their tentative nature.
Alas, it would probably be unreasonable to expect Bull to have knowledge of most of these facts. Besides, his inclusion of Deutsch among the adherents of the scientific approach was based on his reading of a couple of Deutsch’s works published in the 1950s and 1960s. [AQ5] (​#raq5​)In these publications Deutsch did use, though to varying degrees, quantitative and statistical methods associated by Bull with the scientific approach.
Bull’s delineation of the traditional and scientific approaches was, of course, more than just an analytical exercise. It served a disciplinary purpose, whereby it was ‘desirable that if we are to reject the scientific approach we should at the same time pay attention to it and formulate such objections to it as we may have’.20 Lest there were any doubts about Bull’s sentiments, he stressed that the scientific approach had to be kept at bay and ‘firmly in the background’.21 For its contribution has practically been none and ‘in so far as it is intended to encroach upon and ultimately displace the classical approach, it is positively harmful’.22
Bull substantiated his objections by putting forward seven propositions that were intended to illuminate the shortcomings of the scientific approach. Thus, he derided its proponents for (1) limiting themselves to ‘what can be logically or mathematically proved or verified’ and therefore having very little to say about actual international politics, (2) stumbling into significant insights only when ‘stepping beyond the bounds of that approach and employing the classical method’, (3) failing to ‘make progress of the sort to which they aspire’, (4) resorting to the use of models when theorizing, (5) offering analyses that are ‘distorted and impoverished by a fetish for measurement’, (6) making the achievement of rigour in analysis unnecessarily complicated by going beyond the traditional approach and (7) having, due to the abandonment of history and philosophy, a ‘view of their subject and its possibilities that is callow and brash’.23 For a better measure, Bull added a few pointers suggesting why the scientific approach took found particularly fertile ground in the United States. These were based on assertions concerning morally simplistic views of issues in international politics, specifically beliefs that problems might be scientifically understood and hence amenable to solutions via manipulation of the relevant factors.
Karl Deutsch’s work came explicitly under Bull’s attack only with regard to the fifth proposition, that is, because of its propensity to measure and quantify. Bull went so far as to claim that to those adopting the scientific approach ‘quantification of the subject must appear as the supreme ideal’.24 This, as shall be demonstrated in the following sections, was hardly the case. For Deutsch at least, quantification represented a conscious methodological choice because in his view it held a certain potential in answering some crucial questions of international politics and human survival. But it is certainly incorrect to state that quantification was deemed ‘the supreme ideal’. If this was the accusation, Deutsch must have felt little compulsion to defend himself against it.
Bull’s two other criticisms of Deutsch’s scholarship seem, at least on the surface, more plausible. While he admitted that Deutsch’s work, along with that of Bruce Russett, was ‘certainly original and suggestive’, Bull refused to entertain the possibility that such originality might have anything to do with their theoretical and methodological approach. Indeed, Bull once again reiterated that ‘the prominence they give to it [i.e. quantitative analysis] is a source of weakness rather than strength in their arguments’.25 A criticism of this kind is impossible to refute, because one cannot know whether the arguments would have been formulated in the absence of the analytical tools. But few indeed are the scholars who abandon their ways of doing research when actually credited with having come across something that is recognized by others as original and insightful.
Finally, Bull formulated an objection that:
counting often ignores (or, if it does not ignore, skates over) the most relevant differences between the units counted: differences between the content of one item of mail and another, the diplomatic importance of one treaty and another, the significance of one inch of newspaper column and another.26
This claim has since been frequently repeated, most notably by Stanley Hoffmann.27 It was, however, also vigorously disputed by Morton Kaplan and J. David Singer in their polemics with Bull.28 Both Kaplan and Singer noted that information was collected carefully and empirical studies would eventually show whether appropriate information was lumped together or not. In short, the design incorporated the possibility of making corrections.
But perhaps the best answer was provided by Deutsch himself in an article written years before Bull’s. It is therefore not a direct answer, and the ‘reply’ is thus unintentional, though it was obviously written with a view towards possible criticisms of the use of quantitative data. The 1960 article ‘Towards an Inventory of Basic Trends and Patterns in Comparative and International Politics’ clearly foresaw the possibility of a split within the discipline between those inclined to ‘studying political behaviour by quantitative and experimental methods’ and those tending to ‘the humanistic literary and historical tradition of scholarship and judgment’.29 Deutsch warned against the ‘danger of losing communication with each other’ and pleaded for maintaining ‘the unity of the study of politics’.30 While doing so, Deutsch repeatedly stressed that ‘quantitative data can aid the judgment of the political analyst, but cannot replace it in the evaluation of historical cases or in the assessment of possible future developments’.31
Few statements could capture better the futility of trying to castigate Deutsch to one side of the debate created by Bull. The objective of revisiting Bull’s critique, as stressed in the beginning, was not to contemplate its validity, but rather to better understand how Deutsch’s position might have related to the debate. It should be becoming apparent that Deutsch did not directly address the subject of the debate, because he held beliefs that were incompatible with its terms. The following sections will reconstruct further Deutsch’s scholarly position on the problems discussed in the second debate.
The need for traditional and scientific approaches
Central to Karl Deutsch’s study of human relations, of which politics and international politics were an important, but by no means the sole, focus, was preoccupation with the survival of the species and the improvement of its condition. These closely connected concerns spanned the entire arc of his scholarly career and were, undoubtedly, formed well before he began publishing his academic research in the United States in the 1940s. For instance, in 1947 he discussed the question of justice and territorial disputes with the view that social science ‘is called upon to make what contribution it can to the survival of mankind’.32 Much the same sentiment was expressed in an introduction to a collection of his various essays on nationalism, integration and world futures, which appeared more than three decades later in 1979.33
This conviction was accompanied by a specific belief about the role of knowledge in this process and various ways in which knowledge could be gained and forms that it took. Deutsch considered knowledge as beneficial, though he was not blind to its possibly negative effects. Science along with arts, humanities, philosophy and religion represented one activity in the quest to gain knowledge. Irrespective of their specific differences, these pursuits were therefore essentially tied in a larger unity. They could be distinguished in their forms, manifestations and preferences, but not in their purpose.
To choose in the study of human relations in general and in the case of International Relations in particular between the traditional and scientific approaches, a choice that stood at the heart of Bull’s critique of the developments in the field, must have made little sense to Deutsch. In fact, there is ample material to reach the conclusion that he rejected such a division. The rejection did not stem from a preference for the scientific approach as superior to the traditional one, but from a consideration of the limits inherent in each of the approaches as well as from the constraints that they imposed on each other. In short, the questions which motivated Deutsch’s pursuit of knowledge demanded insights from more than just science, more than just humanities and history, and more than just philosophy or religion. All these had to be present in a unified vision of knowledge.
Such a unified vision of knowledge was the guiding idea behind a series of meetings organized by the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life. Its annual symposia began in 1940 and were from the onset headed by Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein and Robert M. MacIver. The organizers’ goal and the aim of their supporters, who numbered many leading intellectual in the United States at that time, was to address the most important political and social questions from the broadest possible perspective incorporating knowledge from natural and social sciences, philosophy, humanities and religion.34 There was clearly a realization that each of these areas could contribute in significant ways. The conference published volumes containing the revised presentations, and these are fascinating in their depth and breadth of covered topics. From the initial three volumes dedicated simply to science, philosophy and religion, the subsequent meetings and ensuing books dealt with a varied range of topics: world peace, group understanding, education and learning, freedom and authority, race relations, symbols and so on.
Karl Deutsch delivered his first paper, on intolerance and its economic drivers, at the 1944 symposium devoted to Approaches to National Unity.35 He remained an active participant in the meetings over the following decade. His papers, in line with his research interests at the time, covered subjects such as justice and territorial disputes, the value of freedom, nationalism, symbols and communication. In 1952, as the conference was seeking greater institutionalization, Deutsch became one of its fellows. It is impossible to precisely establish what kind of effect the participation in the activities of the conference had on Deutsch’s intellectual formation. He was studying questions related to nationalism, discrimination, group understanding and conflict for several years by the time he spoke about them at the conference’s symposia. But it seems reasonable to conclude that taking part in the symposia at least reinforced his overarching views about the need to include in their study both humanistic and scientific approaches.
At about the same time, in the summer of 1950, Deutsch was invited by Charles E. Odegaard, the executive director of the American Council of Learned Societies, to join the newly formed Committee on the Humanistic Aspects of Science. The committee originated from an earlier informal conference on ‘Relationships between Science and Humanities’ and conducted its work until the spring of 1954. Eventually, several of its members, Deutsch included, published a book of their deliberations, entitled Science and the Creative Spirit.36 Deutsch’s essay in the book provides an excellent insight into his belief in what the authors of the book decided to call the ‘humanistic aspects of science’.
Deutsch distinguished the humanities and science along a fairly simple line. Whereas the former put the ‘emphasis on “the whole man”’, the latter isolates ‘events or situations from their contexts’.37 He presented a broad conception of knowledge, which included more than data that could be calculated. In such context, he argued that ‘scientific and humanistic knowledge are thus two different sides of one and the same process of human thinking’.38 Deutsch rejected the notion that what made science distinct was its cumulative nature. It appeared distinctive only because of ‘the importance accorded to this accumulative element in the field of science, and denied to it within the field of humanistic effort’.39 The different strengths of emphasis on the cumulative aspects, stressed Deutsch, ‘should not obscure this basic unity’.40 All this then informed his idea of social sciences, which combine elements that can be expressed as data and treated quantitatively with the effort to understand unique cases.
The decisive move buttressing the need for both humanistic and scientific approaches came from the discussion of the role of values. Deutsch insisted that science depended on the acceptance of a number of values just as moral action was enhanced by scientific knowledge: ‘To act morally is in one sense the opposite of acting blindly’.41 Good will and good intentions are important, but when facing some questions and problems, they are not sufficient on their own. Significantly for the study of International Relations, he invoked the dispute between idealism and realism as an example. The intensity of that conflict hinged, in his view, ‘upon the discrepancy between the strength of the moral convictions involved and the poverty of reliable knowledge of the probable consequences of the proposed courses of action’.42
The solution, however, did not rest in the simple increase of scientific knowledge. Deutsch was well aware and offered a subtle analysis of how growing scientific knowledge might lead to scientific discoveries that could have catastrophic consequences at particular historical moments and within specific social contexts. Rhetorically, he asked, ‘Would it have been better for mankind if Einstein’s principle of relativity, or Chadwick’s discovery of the neutron, or Hahn’s work on uranium fission had all come ten years later than they did, and no atom bomb had been available to drop on Hiroshima?’43 Ultimately, he decided to bet upon the ‘potential goodness’ of science, once again relying on the social and normative context. As he put it, ‘a civilization so prone to commit suicide that it could be saved only by concealing from it the means of its own destruction would not endure for long’.44 The underlying unity of knowledge meant that scientific and humanistic approaches would both enhance and constrain each other.
Indeed, ensuring the unity of knowledge was imperative. Humankind’s survival in ‘transcending the potentially suicidal aspects of its heritage’ demanded the use of ‘all the resources of scientific, humanistic, and religious thinking’.45 To opt for any one of these approaches alone was no panacea. With regard to international politics, the choice could not have been between traditional and scientific approaches. The limits of science, of which Deutsch was well aware, meant that the questions which drove his research required other types of knowledge to inform possible answers.
Normative concerns and the discipline
Normative concerns at the heart of those questions directing Deutsch’s research had other implications besides the need to maintain a diversity of approaches in their study. Specifically, admitting the division between the traditional and scientific approaches would have led to a rupture in the discipline. This prospect genuinely worried Deutsch. In a rare, short personal reflection on his journey though world politics in the late 1980s he recalled the state of the discipline in the 1960s and the early 1970s. He noted how the clashes between the proponents of the different approaches threatened to cause a split in the American Political Science Association (APSA), a split that he would have considered a ‘misfortune’, because ‘the three traditions, the scientific, the descriptive, and the normative, needed each other and the various aspects of truth each of them might discover’.46 As president of the APSA, and later in the 1970s as president of the International Political Science Association, he attempted to work towards unity and pluralism.
This is apparent from the presidential address which he delivered to APSA’s annual meeting in 1970.47 Deutsch repeated several of the themes that he previously articulated with regard to the unity of knowledge and the variety of approaches in seeking it. Beginning with a general question about the types of knowledge produced by theory, he outlined five ‘primarily cognitive’ and four ‘action-oriented’ kinds of knowledge. These were not contrasted to each other, but instead formed indispensable parts of the production cycle of theory with the objective of increasing the ‘chance of critical self-liberation for the specific task of enhancing the power of human beings to know reality and to deal with it’.48 In the given context, he then applied the general observations on theory more directly to the study of political science.49 Echoing his statements made 10 years earlier, he reminded his audience that ‘computers cannot be used as substitutes for thought, nor can data replace values’.50 In short, Deutsch considered it necessary that wisdom ‘what knowledge to seek, what skills to learn, what values to strive for’ had to be accompanied with a concern for collection of data and information. Once again, the various ways of seeking knowledge had to enhance and constrain each other. On the one hand, wisdom without ‘reality control’ would descend into mere ideology, on the other hand, the absence of wisdom would make data gathering ‘the mere piling up of sterile information’.51 Such a conception of political science, and by extension of International Relations, carried with it an inherent element of risk, because normative and value-based choices had to be made as to which questions deserved the most attention. Deutsch outlined two such questions as central: the abolition of poverty and the abolition of large-scale war.
The latter question was present in Deutsch’s scholarship from the beginning, but took on a greater significance, as he was moving into the 1970s. Even before he began spending more time in Germany, where he was asked to head the recently created Social Science Center in West Berlin, Deutsch authored several publications in German that fell within the area of peace research.52 The former question, concerning the abolition of poverty and in a larger sense the question of resource allocation and scarcity were, however, fairly new in his research. The concern was expressed chiefly in the large world-modelling project called GLOBUS (Generating Long-term Options By Using Simulation). But on a more mundane level, it was also reflected in an International Relations textbook written by Deutsch. Whereas the first edition of The Analysis of International Relations published in 1968 opened with a chapter including 10 fundamental questions, the subsequent two editions, issued in 1978 and 1988 respectively, opened with 12 fundamental questions.53 The two sets of questions that were added, found their place in the book under the headings ‘Transnational Processes and International Interdependence’ and ‘World Population vs. Food, Resources, and Environment’.
The emphasis which Deutsch put on value-based questions with normative concerns is not only central when trying to grasp his scholarly position, but is also important for a better understanding of his refusal to participate in the second debate. One of the crucial charges levelled by Bull and other traditionalists was the claim that the adherents of the scientific approach concerned themselves with marginal matters and did not go to the substance of the subject of international politics. As restated by Stanley Hoffman, their choice of scientific methods kept them ‘from asking what were, according to him [i.e. Hedley Bull], the essential questions about international relations’.54 Anybody who takes Karl Deutsch’s work over the decades seriously will almost certainly come to a very different conclusion.
The division at the heart of the second debate was to an important degree predicated on the assumption that the scientific approach was, in its quest for a value-free social science, devoid of normative concerns. Deutsch went to great lengths, and well before the debate actually began, to disprove this assumption. The assumption was not merely wrong or absurd. Crucially, it was actually unhelpful in preserving the necessary unity of knowledge that infused the discipline and the research it produced with normative concerns.
The roots of the methodological choice
There is a fundamental, and potentially fatal, objection to all that has been written so far. Deutsch might have argued for the unity of knowledge, he might have stressed the need for various approaches and acknowledged the normative concerns underlying the key questions. Nevertheless, he did adopt, overwhelmingly, methods introduced by and identified with the scientific approach. There is no denying of this fact. A negatively predisposed critic might well ask whether he talked the talk, but did not walk the walk. The methodological choice has to be somehow explained and, importantly, squared with the other parts identified as constituting Deutsch’s position.
One could fall back on Deutsch’s words in the APSA presidential address that ‘no single theorist, nor any single group of scholars, is likely to make contributions in all these ways [i.e. all parts of the production cycle of theory]’.55 Nevertheless, such an explanation will not do. It would not be an explanation, it would be an excuse. It would not say anything about why Deutsch made the choice he did. A more substantial argument is required and it can be, I believe, reconstructed from Deutsch’s writings. One of these is a review essay which, by all indications, has never been published, though Deutsch did try to do so in several journals and presented it publicly.56
In the late 1950s Deutsch wrote a review essay of a book The New Landscape in Art and Science by Gyorgy Kepes, a Hungarian émigré painter who subsequently taught visual design at MIT. The book presented, among others, a series of pictures that were made possible by new scientific techniques. Deutsch argued that the book offered ‘an important statement of the relations between [...] the experience of science and the experience of art’.57 The book thus fits well with the familiar idea of the unity of knowledge. Deutsch’s text conveyed an obvious fascination with what kind of images could newly be captured by camera: ‘We are at the edge of a new world of insight, a new range of sensitivity and of understanding’.58 For Deutsch, the images supported the point that art, just like science, did not mirror reality, but transformed it into a code. This was a key insight, because the process of transformation into a code could yield novel patterns, which until now have not and could not have been noticed and were, at best, only imagined by artists. Deutsch gave the example of Marcel Duchamp’s famous modernist painting Nude Descending a Staircase which preceded similar visualizations caught through the means of a high-speed camera by more than two decades. As he remarked, ‘slowly, slowly, the high-speed camera is catching up to the artist’s vision of reality’.59 Learning the new language of patterns and processes enabled the realization of differing scales. This led Deutsch to formulate an impression inspired by the book that man ‘has the ability to transcend his own scale’.60
Transcendence of scale and pattern recognition are, of course, central themes in Deutsch’s research on nationalism, integration and disintegration, or political communication.61 They are also core elements of his writing on security community, which is today undoubtedly Deutsch’s best known concept in International Relations.62 The research on security communities combined precisely the recognition of a new pattern of interaction between political communities as well as the potential transcendence of scale on which security could be provided and thought of. Methods connected with the scientific tradition made it possible to notice both these processes.
Deutsch was convinced that humanity was ‘becoming increasingly familiar with patterns of change and of motion’, even though this was merely the beginning.63 The increasing familiarity came as a result of the unprecedented capacity to generate data and treat them in new ways. As he told his audience at the APSA annual meeting, ‘technical improvements can work not only for the status quo but at least as much for those who work for its change’.64 With these expanding options, it became a matter of courage and imagination whether and how they would be used in trying to creatively answer the old questions – perhaps this was now finally possible for at least some of them – as well as the new problems facing humankind. The echoes of Horace’s Sapere aude! (Dare to know!), which Immanuel Kant put at the centre of his essay What is Enlightenment? are unmistakable.
It was the refusal to accept the status quo, which he perceived as obviously unsatisfactory from his humanistic perspective, that led Deutsch to adopt the methods linked with the scientific approach. Bull and other traditionalists, perhaps unsurprisingly, given the status quo bias in the English school, and other traditionalists did not allow for the possibility that the adoption of the scientific methods might have been a way how to address the normative concerns. [AQ6] (​#raq6​)It should also be apparent that pitching the debate among the traditional and scientific approaches as a quest for ‘cognitive authority’65 of the discipline of International Relations is, at least as far as Deutsch is concerned, rather impoverishing. Certainly in his case, the methods of the scientific approach served a bigger purpose than simply the instrumentality of enhancing the field’s stature. For Deutsch, the issue was not whether IR could be studied as science, but what could studying IR with the addition of scientific methods do for a better understanding of international politics in so far as the transformative potential of knowledge was concerned.
Conclusion
The starting point of this article was the puzzle why Karl Deutsch did not directly enter into the second debate in International Relations. The puzzle served the larger aim of reconstructing Deutsch’s scholarly position on the study of social relations in general and international politics in particular. This, in turn, allowed for a better understanding of his rejection of the terms of the debate initiated by Hedley Bull. The key arguments are threefold. Deutsch did not accept the division between the traditional and scientific approaches because it contradicted his belief in the unity of knowledge, where multiple approaches were indispensable. Preserving and using the multiplicity of approaches was necessary in order to formulate and answer normative concerns which stood at the centre of key questions addressed by the field. Finally, Deutsch opted for the methods of the scientific approach, because they contained previously unexplored potential in answering those questions and transforming international politics.
The ultimate irony is that Bull, so closely related with the concept of the anarchical society, stressed the social element in international politics as much as Deutsch. For example, it can be envisaged how Bull’s different types of international societies could be grasped in terms of Deutsch’s communication theory. Arend Lijphart argued that Deutsch played a crucial role in forming and consolidating a new paradigm in the study of international politics. He called it the Grotian paradigm. For its theoretical expression Lijphart referred to none other than Hedley Bull, while the empirical substantiation of his argument came from the work of Karl Deutsch on security communities.66 Obviously, Lijphart did not fail to notice the suspicion with which the link between Bull and Deutsch might be met.67 He therefore claimed that Bull represented a deviant case among traditionalists.68 But such a view seems rather unsatisfactory. Why, for example, should Bull and not Deutsch be considered a deviant case? And why does one have to think in the language of deviant cases to begin with?
Then again, spotting unexpected patterns, categorizing information, disassembling and reassembling it in novel ways was precisely a type of scholarly activity that Deutsch called for and would have welcomed. The central questions with which he was preoccupied – survival in the presence of the unprecedented destructive potential of nuclear weapons and in the face of resource scarcity and depletion – remain. Addressing them will require keeping in mind the key guiding principles outlined by Karl Deutsch – wisdom towards what needs to be known, so that the potential course of action is as well informed as possible.
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